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Funds, fees and performance 
Karel Lannoo 
Despite recent advances made in eliminating fragmentation and in standardising fees and 
performance across the European market for retail investment products, these efforts have 
produced limited or no effect so far. Further policy initiatives can thus be expected, as investors 
are the victim and market efficiency is at stake. 
 
he European market for retail investment products is extremely diverse in distribution 
networks, user preferences, regulatory treatment and supervisory attitudes, resulting in 
a high degree of fragmentation and a wide variety of customer fees and performance. 
Cross-border comparability is very difficult, as cost elements are not standardised, and price 
competition is hampered. As a result, retail investors refrain from investing in investment 
products and prefer to keep savings in deposits. The EU has attempted to address these 
shortcoming, as reflected most recently in the revamped version of the Markets in financial 
instruments Directive (MiFID II), and other measures are being implemented. So far, however, 
these have produced limited or no effect, as a recent study carried out for the European 
Commission concludes (European Commission, 2018a). Further policy initiatives can thus be 
expected, as investors are the victim and market efficiency is at stake. 
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Two recent studies stand as hallmarks in the debate over retail investment product charges and 
performance. In a study on fund performance, ESMA (2017) found that over the three-year 
horizon (2013-15), ongoing fees, one-off charges and inflation reduced the returns available to 
investors on average by 29% of gross returns or, in absolute terms, by 252bps. Fees charged to 
retail investors reduce their returns more than those charged to institutional investors. As 
shown in Figure 1, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden – countries that have implemented 
unbundling rules or more centrally organised long-term saving plans – have significantly lower 
charges, which are about half that of the most-costly country – Belgium – where total charges 
reduce returns by 31% (before inflation). By asset type, the highest reductions apply to the 
money market (34.8%) and bond funds (31.9%) for retail clients (before inflation) and or for 
actively managed funds compared to passively managed funds. 
Figure 1. Reduction in fund returns (expenses, sales and redemption fees) before inflation (%) 
 
Source: ESMA (2018). 
The more recent study cited earlier (European Commission, 2018a) on the distribution of retail 
investment products concluded that there is a complete mismatch between supply and 
demand. Using mystery shopping – a tool used by market research companies to measure the 
quality of service, compliance with regulation or to gather specific information about products 
and services – the inquiry found that comparing and interpreting fees across providers and 
products is very difficult, even for a well-informed investor. Information provided to clients is 
not transparent and nor is it standardised across countries. Fees vary widely depending on the 
investment product and distributor, with the overall lowest fees (about 1%) charged for listed 
equities and bonds, and exchange traded funds (including execution and custody fees). The 
highest fees applied to equity, mixed and real estate funds, with the fees totaling 8% if an 
investor sells the product within one year (entry, exit and ongoing charges). The average first-
year cost for an investment product in the sample was 4% (entry and ongoing charges, see 
Table 1). Hence, retail investors may abstain from investing at all in investment products. 
  
9,2 9,7
14,7 15,2
16
17
19,5 19,8
22
26,7 27,2
27,7 28,4
31
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
NL SE UK DK FI IRL DE EU FR ES LU IT AT BE
FUNDS, FEES AND PERFORMANCE | 3 
Table 1. Average entry, exit and ongoing charges on investment products in the EU (% of 
assets) 
 Real 
estate 
funds 
Mixed 
funds 
Equity 
funds 
Bond 
funds 
Money 
market 
funds 
Guaranteed 
life 
insurance  
Life 
insurance 
Guaranteed 
pension 
products 
Pension 
products 
Pension 
mutual 
funds 
Average 
Entry 3.76% 3.77% 3.65% 2.87% 1.37% 2.88% 2.22% 3.40% 2.19% 2.30% 2.84% 
Exit 3.20% 2.73% 2.01% 1.69% 1.25% 1.83% 1.03% 2.62% 0.97% 1.65% 1.90% 
Ongoing 
charges 
1.28% 1.51% 1.89% 1.01% 0.39% 0.88% 1.38% 0.87% 1.45% 1.15% 1.18% 
Total 8.24% 8.01% 7.55% 5.57% 3.01% 5.59% 4.63% 6.89% 4.61% 5.10% 5.92% 
Source: European Commission (2018a). 
 
The most independent financial advice is available in countries that have actively implemented 
unbundling requirements and have banned inducements, such as the UK and the Netherlands, 
which also have the lowest fees, as shown in Figure 1. The study concludes that financial 
services for consumers are consistently ranked among “the poorest performing services 
market”. Digitalisation or robo-advice will not necessarily change this assessment. Even if it may 
make it easier to compare products, it will not reduce the sheer complexity of the supply. The 
study also indicates that fees for robo-advice are often either difficult to find on the webpage 
and/or are presented in a complicated way. In addition, to decipher the display of fees, a certain 
degree of financial literacy is required, which on average is quite low.  
As a result of the unbundling requirement introduced in MiFID II, charges on investment 
products may decline, but the appetite to invest in such products may go down as well. To 
tackle conflicts of interest, MiFID II requires providers to inform clients whether their 
investment advice is provided on an independent basis, i.e. that it is paid for by the user. 
Payments from third parties to sell certain financial products to clients, apart from certain 
“minor non-monetary benefits”, are prohibited. The willingness to pay for advice is generally 
low, and even lower when an investor becomes aware of the possible conflicts of interest his 
advisor faces, according to the study. This was demonstrated by the experience of the Retail 
Distribution Review (RDR) in the UK, aimed at introducing more transparency in the investment 
industry, improving services through higher qualifications and ensuring that investors 
understand the true cost of advice. The future model for investment advice will be robo-advice, 
which has been widely adopted in countries that have implemented unbundling. But algorithms 
used by robo-advice should be closely controlled and tested, to ensure that the suitability 
criteria are properly applied and that consumers are not directed towards unsuitable products. 
Comparison tools should be certified. 
A more far-reaching initiative may thus be required to shake-up the fragmented and costly fund 
markets and stimulate retail investors towards higher-performing investments. Policy-makers 
could strive to i) stimulate initiatives towards market consolidation, in different ways, and ii) 
make cost structures more comparable or eventually cap charges. 
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Market consolidation initiatives 
Several efforts have already been taken to facilitate market consolidation, but with limited 
results so far. The main problem is that product development is supply-driven, and not 
necessarily demand-driven, with some exceptions. The priority should therefore be to develop 
a simple, low-cost product that generates scale and is designed with users’ interests in mind. 
An example is the Investment Savings Account (ISK) in Sweden, or possibly the proposed Pan-
European Pension Products (PEPPs) from the Commission. Earlier EU initiatives, contained in 
the UCITS IV amendments, have facilitated mergers among funds, but regulatory barriers still 
remain. 
Sweden’s Investment Savings Account (ISK) is a simple and transparent product, designed for 
households, with comparability parameters between all product providers on a webpage. It has 
a low level of taxation, and its assets are mostly in equity and balanced funds, with very low 
levels of cash. About 1.8 million residents have an ISK, or almost 20% of the population. The 
PEPPs proposal aims to introduce something similar at European level, but its design is still 
under discussion. A big advantage of the PEPPs should be the single authorisation by EIOPA, 
the EU insurance authority, which should allow for scale and exclude regulatory arbitrage, as is 
the case for investment funds today. 
Cost structures 
On the cost structures, the impact of MiFID II and the rules governing PRIIPs (packaged retail 
and insurance-based investment products) should allow for more standardised transaction cost 
data, but it is still too early to judge their utility, according to industry participants, as the data 
are not yet aligned and are only available for a limited period. In addition, PRIIPS will apply to 
UCITS only from 2020 onwards. The European Commission (2018b), from its side, recently 
proposed to standardise national marketing requirements and regulatory fees for funds, to 
facilitate cross-border distribution of funds through better comparison of costs. Additional 
national marketing requirements by supervisory authorities and diverse fee structures are a 
hindrance to market integration. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has 
been given the competence to propose technical guidelines in this respect and also to manage 
a centralised database with the fees or charges applied by the competent authorities. It is difficult 
to see, however, how this initiative will interact with the transparency of industry charges, which 
are contained in MIFID II and PRIIPS, or whether it will make it even more complex. 
The advent of Brexit makes the picture even more blurred. With about 40% of the EU’s assets 
under management concentrated in the UK, it seems that Brexit may paradoxically lead to 
higher costs, certainly in the short term, as businesses will have to re-think their operational 
models across the entire value chain. Asset management – but also clearing, settlement and 
custody – may end up even more fragmented as a result, in an area that was already not 
remarkably highly concentrated in the first place, certainly as compared to the US. Hence, 
fragmentation may grow, and the industry’s performance will be negatively affected as a result, 
the cost of which will be passed on to the consumer.   
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The way forward 
EU regulation has contributed to reducing cost for the directly investing in equity and bonds by 
increasing the competition among market operators. Direct exposure of households to these 
products has declined in most European countries, however, while they are mostly exposed 
indirectly through investment funds or other forms of institutional investment, where costs 
remain prohibitively high. 
The asset management sector is the least harmonised across the EU. The rules depend on the 
type of licence that the financial institution in question possesses – which may be as a bank, an 
asset management company, an insurance company, a pension fund, a broker – and the 
product the company distributes. Progress has been achieved with MiFID II, PRIIPs and the 
Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD), but huge differences remain concerning the 
appreciation and respect of rules and in the diversity of investor protection rules. Much remains 
to be done to achieve more supervisory convergence, but this is very difficult since many 
different actors are involved: the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), the ECB and 
the National Competent Authorities (NCAs). This structure is too complex, and there is too 
much regulatory competition. Moreover, the role of supervisors in capital markets differs 
markedly from that in banking. 
Hence, a reduction in the fees for funds in the EU is not imminent, because of the multiplicity 
of providers and supervisors involved. The implementation of MiFID II, and the unbundling 
requirement, will certainly have an effect, but it will take another two years before its impact 
on fees becomes apparent. An attractive PEPPs or alternatively, a pan-European long-term 
savings scheme is the best solution forward in the longer term. Another priority is 
strengthening the powers of the ESAs, and ESMA in particular, over NCAs in the authorisation 
of products and the control of cost structures. Article 9 of the ESA regulations requires the 
authorities to “…take a leading role in promoting transparency, simplicity and fairness in the 
market for consumer financial products” and allows them to prohibit or limit certain financial 
activities. This requirement is repeated in MiFIR’s Article 40, which was invoked for the first 
time in an ESMA decision of 1 June 2018, to ban binary options and to restrict contracts for 
differences (CFDs), but it is only temporarily in effect, i.e. it has to be renewed every three 
months. 
Would it be possible for the European Commission to cap charges? The abundance and 
complexity of the fund markets provide a clear reason for the European Commission to argue 
that competition nor the single market functions in this sector, for which retail investors end 
up paying the price. To address this failure and to allow for a more balanced financial system, 
one option could be to impose a limit on charges, but this would require a sufficient level of 
standardisation across the cost structures. And to start with, transparency would have to be 
significantly improved and careful scrutiny given to the impact of the unbundling requirement. 
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